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PROJECT FINANCE, SECURITIZATION
AND CONSENSUALITY
CARL S. BJERRE*
International project finance transactions have generally at-
tracted the attention of legal scholars to a much lesser degree than
have securitization transactions.  This imbalance is unfortunate, be-
cause in light of their complexity, sheer magnitude, and social impor-
tance, international project finance transactions might fairly be called
the 800-pound gorillas of structured finance.  This essay explores as-
pects of these transactions ranging from the technical to the broadly
social and moral, borrowing in part from the insights of the Nobel
prize-winning economist Amartya Sen.
In the financial transactions arena, there is an unfortunate rift
between two kinds of scholarship.  Scholarship that confronts the
philosophical and policy-based groundings of the transactions tends
to focus on relatively simple transactions such as retail sales con-
tracts,1 secured loans,2 and the like, and tends to ignore more complex
transactions, notably including structured finance transactions.  In-
stead, the writing on structured finance and other complex transac-
tions dwells almost exclusively on doctrinal and practical questions
such as how the transactions work and how they are negotiated.  In
this essay I seek to avoid the latter approach, and seek instead to be-
gin bringing to bear on these complex transactions the kind of philo-
sophical and policy-based analysis that generally is seen only in the
context of simpler transactions.  This essay of course makes no at-
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1. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 741 (1982); Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. &
ECON. 293 (1975); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983); Symposium, Unconscionability Around the World: Seven Perspec-
tives on the Contractual Doctrine, 14 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 435 (1992).
2. See, e.g., Symposium, The Priority of Secured Debt, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1279 (1997);
Symposium, Revision of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783 (1994).
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tempt to fill that void on its own (let alone to offer a practical cure for
the dilemmas that it isolates), but I hope that it will serve as the
opening of a door to further discussion of that kind.
In Part I of this essay, I sketch the structural features that project
finance and securitizations transactions do or do not have in common
with each other, focusing on a number of occasions in which the lan-
guage usually used to describe the transactions is deceptively simple,
and in which differences apparently in kind are revealed actually to
be differences in degree.  In Part II, I examine the overriding of anti-
assignment clauses, which is one of many commercial law doctrines
on which both patterns of transaction depend.  The doctrine is fasci-
nating because it raises an intractable conundrum of consent and co-
ercion: will the law honor the freedom of contract of the party insist-
ing on the anti-assignment clause, or will it honor the freedom of
alienation of the party insisting on violating the anti-assignment
clause?  In Part III, I shift Part II’s considerations of consent and co-
ercion from the doctrinal to the social level.  International project fi-
nance transactions have a very high, dramatically visible degree of
impact (both positive and negative) on third parties, far more pat-
ently so than do securitization transactions.  Though the positive as-
pects of this impact are far too important to justify simplistic condem-
nations, and though no one should be surprised by the fact that there
are negative externalities in business transactions, I call for fresh and
interdisciplinary attention to the negative effects of project finance on
non-consenting third parties.  These negative effects are cast into uni-
fied theoretical perspective by Amartya Sen’s “capabilities approach”
to development, which focuses on questions of human agency, and
holds that development must be justified, if at all, not only by its eco-
nomic benefits but also by its impact on substantive human freedoms.
In Part IV, I conclude, based on the doctrinal inquiry of Part II and
the social inquiry of Part III, that the philosophically crucial term
“consensual transaction,” like much of the structural terminology
with which I began in Part I, has been understood in a way that is
troublingly simplistic in comparison to the reality that the term pur-
ports to describe.
The subject of international project finance transactions is a
natural point on which to center an essay of this kind, because these
transactions have such a distinctive profile: their scale is enormous,
their structure is sophisticated, their details are arcane and, most im-
portant for purposes of this essay, their effects on the world around
them are often highly visible and dramatic.  But the points that I
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make in Parts II, III, and IV in the context of international project fi-
nance transactions also hold true, to a greater or lesser degree, for
many or most other patterns of large business transactions, even
when their profile is less distinctive.  Accordingly, my focus on project
finance should be understood simply as exploiting a natural, conven-
ient starting place for this essay’s reflections, rather than as isolating
one form of financing for special critique.  I seek to raise broad ques-
tions, rather than to argue narrow points.
I.  QUESTIONS OF DEFINITION
Structured finance can be loosely defined as the practice of ar-
ranging for a lender3 to make a loan under conditions that are struc-
tured so as to free the lender from concern over the credit-worthiness
of the borrower.  Being repaid is, of course, the central concern of any
lender, and the credit-worthiness of a borrower is ordinarily of central
importance to that concern, but innovative practices in law and fi-
nance have generated ways of greatly reducing the importance of bor-
rower credit-worthiness.  Specifically, in a structured finance transac-
tion, the lender relies for repayment on assets that are legally
separate from the borrower, so as to be independent of certain risks
related to the possible bankruptcy of the borrower.4  In the words of
3. In some structured finance contexts, the term “lender” ceases to be entirely appropri-
ate for the provider of funds, even though it occupies a role closely analogous to a traditional
lender.  Notably, in a securitization transaction, the role of lender is filled by buyers of the secu-
rities backed by the receivables.  See infra text accompanying note 8.  At issue here is not just a
terminological nicety: it is problematic simply to call these parties lenders because of the very
essence of structured finance, i.e. that they look for repayment primarily to assets other than
those of their borrowers.
4. Thus, the term does not include garden variety secured lending, because in such a
transaction the collateral is not legally separate from the borrower, and thus, if the borrower
becomes the subject of a bankruptcy proceeding, the collateral will be property of the bank-
ruptcy estate.  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1994) (property of estate includes all legal or eq-
uitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case); United States v.
Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204 n.8 (1983) (declaring that although § 541(a)(1) speaks in
terms of the debtor’s interests in property, rather than property in which the debtor has an in-
terest, “this choice of language was not meant to limit the expansive scope of the section”).
The assets must also be free of bankruptcy risk other than that of the borrower, to the ex-
tent possible.  For example, a simple loan transaction accompanied by a guaranty, stand-by let-
ter of credit, or other secondary obligation, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND
GUARANTY § 1(1) (1996), is not a structured finance transaction even when the lender relies for
repayment solely on the assets of the secondary obligor.  The reason is that those assets of the
secondary obligor, though independent of the risk of bankruptcy of the borrower itself, remain,
of course, subject to the risk of bankruptcy of the secondary obligor.  Only when the risk of
bankruptcy of the asset owner (whether a secondary obligor or the borrower itself) is mini-
mized, as by structuring that owner as a special purpose vehicle (SPV) as discussed infra text
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one respected group of experts, “Structured financings are based on
one central, core principle—a defined group of assets can be structur-
ally isolated, and thus serve as the basis of a financing that is inde-
pendent as a legal matter, from the bankruptcy risks of the former
owner of the assets.”5
Securitization, which developed embryonically in the 1970s and
now represents “[o]ne of the dominant means of capital formation in
the United States and increasingly throughout the world,” illustrates
this principle.6  In a prototypical securitization transaction, a business
enterprise (called an originator) that generates large volumes of re-
ceivables raises capital by selling some or all of those receivables to a
special purpose vehicle (SPV).7  To take typical examples, a retailer of
big-ticket goods (with a high volume of purchase price payments
owed to it by customers), or a credit card lender or other finance
company (with a high volume of loan repayments owed to it by bor-
rowers) will form a corporation or other entity for the sole purpose of
buying its receivables.  That SPV will, simultaneously with its pur-
chase of the receivables, issue securities backed by the eventual col-
lections on those receivables.  The SPV funds its payment of the pur-
chase price for the receivables with the capital provided to the SPV
by the investors who purchase the securities.  The sale from the origi-
nator to the SPV is carefully set up so as to constitute a true sale for
purposes of bankruptcy law, so that in the event of a bankruptcy of
the originator, the courts will treat the receivables as being legally
separate from the originator, rather than as property of the originator
subject to a security interest of the SPV.8
accompanying notes 7–8, do such transactions stand to qualify as structured finance transac-
tions, rather than as the mere substitution of one substantial bankruptcy risk for another sub-
stantial bankruptcy risk.
5. COMM. ON BANKR. AND CORPORATE REORGANIZATION OF THE ASS’N OF THE BAR
OF THE CITY OF N.Y., STRUCTURED FINANCING TECHNIQUES 4 (1995) [hereinafter
STRUCTURED FINANCING TECHNIQUES] (originally appearing at 50 BUS. LAW. 527, 529
(1995)); see also Comm. on Bankr. and Corporate Reorganization of the Ass’n of the Bar of the
City of New York, New Developments in Structured Finance, 56 BUS. LAW. 95 (2000) (providing
an update of the 1995 piece).  The term “former owner” in the quoted passage is very apt in the
context of securitization transactions, as explained below, but is potentially misleading in other
contexts.  See infra Part I.A (discussing ab initio separateness of assets from sponsor in project
finance context).
6. Pamela B. Gann, Foreword to Symposium, International Issues In Cross-Border Securi-
tization and Structured Finance, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 229, 230 (1998).
7. The SPV is set up so as to be bankruptcy remote.  See infra notes 20–22 and accompa-
nying text.  The term “special purpose entity” (SPE) is often used in place of the term SPV.
8. See supra note 4 (discussing simple secured loan versus structured finance transaction).
The net result is that the buyers of the securities provide the funds to the originators.  As a
BJERRE ARTICLE_FMT.DOC 06/12/02  1:47 PM
2002] PROJECT FINANCE, SECURITIZATION AND CONSENSUALITY 415
Project finance transactions, though also a species of structured
finance transaction, are different both in purpose and in procedure.
In a project finance transaction, an existing business enterprise (or a
cooperative venture among more than one of them) sponsors an SPV
for the purpose of building and operating a large-scale, long-term,
revenue-generating infrastructure project.9  Typical examples include
power plants, oil or gas pipeline systems, ports, and telecommunica-
tions networks.10  The capital needed for the building of the project is
provided principally by lenders who rely for repayment on the receiv-
ables that they expect the project eventually to generate.  For exam-
ple, the power plant will typically have a long-term power purchase
agreement with a government utility or other party, and the oil or gas
pipeline system will typically have corresponding contracts obligating
third parties to pay for the project’s services.  Lenders decide whether
to extend credit to the SPV based on the projected receivables from
these contracts (generally called off-take contracts), rather than on
the assets of the sponsors.11
Beneath the differing profiles presented by these brief descrip-
tions, the two patterns of transaction have important structural simi-
larities as well as differences.
structural matter, then, these buyers can be analogized to lenders, though as a technical matter
they are not lenders.  See supra note 3.
For background reading on securitization transactions, see generally 1 TAMAR FRANKEL,
SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSET POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED
SECURITIES (1991 & Supp. 2002); 2 TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED
FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSET POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES (1991 & Supp. 2002);
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET
SECURITIZATION (3d ed. 2002); 1 SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS (Jason H.P. Kravitt
ed., 2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2002).
9. The element of new construction is not always implicated here.  Some project finance
transactions are set up for the purpose of financing the continued operation of already existing
projects, for example, in the context of a privatization of formerly public-sector operations.  See
infra note 42 and accompanying text.
10. Other project finance projects may involve toll roads, wastewater treatment facilities,
water desalinization plants, mining operations, and the like.  See Carl S. Bjerre, International
Project Finance Transactions: Selected Issues Under Revised UCC Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J.
261, 263 (1999).
11. For background reading on project finance transactions, see generally SCOTT L.
HOFFMAN, THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE (2d ed. 2001);
GRAHAM D. VINTER, PROJECT FINANCE: A LEGAL GUIDE (2d ed. 2001); Bjerre, supra note
10; Symposium, Project Finance and International Investment Law, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1029
(2001).
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A. True Sale, Other Structural Isolations, and Degrees of Recourse
One marked difference between securitizations and project fi-
nance transactions has already emerged from the foregoing brief dis-
cussion: the element of true sale that is so crucial to the former is ab-
sent from the latter.  Given that structured finance is defined by the
isolation of assets, and that in a securitization this isolation is
achieved by means of a true sale, how can project finance transactions
achieve a parallel kind of structural isolation without a true sale?
Project finance does depend on the isolation of receivables, just as se-
curitization does; the risk of bankruptcy of a sponsor is a cloud to be
removed from project finance receivables just as the risk of bank-
ruptcy of an originator is a cloud to be removed from securitization
transactions.  But in a project finance transaction, no sale (true or
otherwise) is needed to accomplish this goal, for a simple yet, to my
knowledge, never-articulated reason: in a project finance transaction,
the receivables are isolated inherently from the moment of their in-
ception, simply because they are generated by the SPV rather than by
the sponsors.  By contrast, in a securitization, isolation depends on a
sale transaction only because the receivables are generated by the
originator rather than by the SPV.
Associated with this technical distinction is a more common-
sense, real-world one.  While securitization transactions enhance the
financial profile of an already-operating enterprise (by replacing the
enterprise’s accounts receivable with immediately available capital),
project finance transactions initiate the operations of a wholly new
enterprise.  Prototypical securitization transactions do not give birth
to new retailers or lenders, but prototypical project finance transac-
tions do give birth to new power plants, pipelines, and other infra-
structure operations.12  This distinction is powerful and far-reaching,
because a transaction that creates an entirely new business enter-
prise—especially a major infrastructure enterprise in an emerging
economy—will inherently have a much more visible impact on non-
parties than one that does not.
Related to the absence of a true sale element in project finance
transactions is the issue of recourse.  If the obligors on the receivables
in either pattern of transaction fail to make payments, to what degree
12. As noted, however, some project finance transactions are a means of privatization and
thus involve the acquisition of existing operations rather than the creation of new ones.  See in-
fra note 42 and accompanying text.  By the same token, the capital made available to originators
in a securitization transaction may be used by those originators to expand into new business ar-
eas.
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may the transaction documents provide that the investors in a securi-
tization have recourse against the originator, or that the lenders in a
project finance transaction have recourse against the sponsor?  Under
both patterns, the paradigmatic transactions involve little or no re-
course, but in practice the answers vary, and can differ sharply as be-
tween securitization and project finance.  In a project finance transac-
tion, the level of recourse is important for reasons affecting the
business judgment of the sponsors and prospective investors, but is
irrelevant to the legal structure of the transactions per se.13  By con-
trast, in a securitization transaction, any recourse against the origina-
tor in excess of certain guidelines generally has been considered in-
consistent with the crucial element of true sale.14  For that reason, a
given marginally higher amount of recourse can change the econom-
ics of the deal for a securitization originator by far more than that
same marginally higher amount would change the economics for a
project finance sponsor.  The general point behind securitization’s
harsher approach to recourse is quite sensible: the more an originator
is exposed to risk arising from non-payment by the obligors on the re-
ceivables, the more the transaction becomes economically indistin-
guishable from a loan to the originator secured by an interest in the
receivables, as opposed to a true outright sale of those receivables.15
13. See, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note 11, at 8 (observing that truly nonrecourse project fi-
nance “is rarely the case.  In most project financings, there are limited obligations and responsi-
bilities of the project sponsor . . . . How much recourse [is] necessary to support a financing is
determined by the unique risks presented in a project, and the appetite of the credit markets to
accept the risks.”).
14. Recourse up to the level of historical patterns of non-payment, or of other expected
losses, is generally thought to be permissible, but no more.  See, e.g., STRUCTURED FINANCING
TECHNIQUES, supra note 5, at 18–20 (originally appearing at 50 BUS. LAW. 527, 543 (1995));
STANDARD & POOR’S, STRUCTURED FINANCE: LEGAL CRITERIA 183 (2000) (“A guarantee by
the seller of payment on the sold assets is acceptable, but only to the level of expected losses.”).
In a case in which countervailing factors other than recourse weighed heavily enough in favor of
a true sale, a court might not treat a level of recourse in excess of the foregoing as being disposi-
tive per se, but the large sums at stake keep the parties who plan these transactions from being
willing to explore this murky territory.
15. See U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 4 (2000) (referring to the “difficult problems of distinguishing
between transactions in which a receivable secures an obligation and those in which the receiv-
able has been sold outright.  In many commercial financing transactions the distinction is
blurred.”); STRUCTURED FINANCING TECHNIQUES, supra note 5.  But see Peter V. Pantaleo et
al., Rethinking the Role of Recourse in the Sale of Financial Assets, 52 BUS. LAW. 159 (1996) (ar-
guing that a high level recourse, providing it does not assure an ultimate rate of return, should
not be inconsistent with true sale); Thomas E. Plank, The True Sale of Loans and the Role of
Recourse, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 287 (1991) (arguing that even full recourse to originator
should not necessarily be dispositive).
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Ill-considered moves recently have been afoot in Congress to
make recourse simply irrelevant to the true sale decision in many se-
curitizations.16  A much sounder course would be to retain recourse as
a crucial factor in the true sale decision while also dispensing with the
unnecessary woodenness of current doctrine.  As just seen, the ques-
tion of true sale versus security interest is generally imagined in terms
of black and white, so that one marginal increase in a transaction’s
level of recourse may have no effect, while another marginal increase
can potentially result in a Draconian recharacterizing of the entire
transaction.  The law can and should be suppler than this, perhaps by
coming to recognize that the trueness of a sale can be a matter of de-
gree rather than an all-or-nothing proposition.  Both in daily life and
in the more exacting context of the law, we routinely adapt our deci-
sion-making processes to the simple fact that much of the world is
structured in terms of shades of gray, and that those shades of gray
cannot all be reduced to simple black or white.  In the language of the
cognitive sciences, some categories are “graded,” that is, items can
have greater or lesser degrees of membership in these categories.17
The concept of “tall” is a simple example from daily life: we are un-
troubled by the idea that, while some persons are unquestionably tall
and others unquestionably not, most persons fall at various interme-
16. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420, 107th Cong. § 912 (2001).  This provision
would amend 11 U.S.C. § 541(b) (1994) to exclude receivables from the property of the debtor’s
estate to the extent that they were “transferred by the debtor, before the date of commence-
ment of the case, to an eligible entity in connection with an asset-based securitization.”  The
provision goes on to define “transferred” for purposes of this section as follows:
the debtor, under a written agreement, represented and warranted that eligible assets
were sold, contributed, or otherwise conveyed with the intention of removing them
from the estate of the debtor . . . irrespective and without limitation of (A) whether the
debtor directly or indirectly obtained or held an interest in the issuer or in any securi-
ties issued by the issuer; (B) whether the debtor had an obligation to repurchase or to
service or supervise the servicing of all or any portion of such eligible assets; or (C) the
characterization of such sale, contribution, or other conveyance for tax, accounting,
regulatory reporting or other purposes.
Id.; see also Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, S. 625, 106th Cong. § 903 (2000) (similar predeces-
sor bill).  Although clauses (A) and (B) are classic situations that create recourse against the
seller, the bill declares that those situations are not to be considered, nor are others (such as,
presumably, more blatant forms of recourse), so long as the debtor has represented and war-
ranted that there has been a true sale.  See, e.g., Lois R. Lupica, Circumvention of the Bank-
ruptcy Process: The Statutory Institutionalization of Securitization, 33 CONN. L. REV. 199, 226–
30 (2000); Lois R. Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the Bankruptcy Dy-
namic, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 287, 310–22 (2001).  This bill has had a long, rocky, and
highly politicized path through Congress, and its eventual fate remains unclear.  See, e.g., Riva
D. Atlas, Bill to Alter Bankruptcy Seems to Stall, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at C1.
17. See, e.g., GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT
CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 12–57 (1987) (providing an overview of the evolution
of these and related ideas).
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diate points on the spectrum.  Similarly, to take one example from the
law, the Bankruptcy Code already imposes on judges the task of de-
termining where, on a spectrum, to fix the value of collateral.18  Re-
conceptualizing the trueness of a sale in similarly graded terms would
accommodate simultaneously the simple reality that the level of re-
course in a transaction is a matter of degree, and the common sense
conclusion that the effect of that level of recourse should be a matter
of degree, too.19
B. Degrees of Specialness and the Agglutination of the Two
Patterns
An interesting sidelight on the basic distinctions discussed above
concerns the scope of powers of the respective transactions’ SPVs.  In
both securitization transactions and project finance transactions, the
SPV is set up in a way calculated to make it bankruptcy remote, that
is, remote from the prospect of a bankruptcy proceeding of its own,
and removed from the risk of its being substantively consolidated in
the bankruptcy of the originator or sponsor.  Though the details of
this process will not be explored here,20 one crucial aspect of bank-
ruptcy remoteness is that the SPV’s powers, as set forth in its corpo-
rate charter or other organizational documents, be kept as limited as
possible.  Unlike with ordinary operating companies, whose charters
18. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994) (providing that the value of collateral determines the
amount of a creditor’s secured claim).
19. Current doctrine is premised on the idea that the trueness of a sale is not a graded cate-
gory: receivables are either property of the estate or are not, 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1994), and buyers
of receivables are entitled automatic perfection while those who hold receivables as security for
a debt are not.  See U.C.C. § 9-309(2), (3), (4) (2000) (providing for automatic perfection of
various receivables sales).  These doctrines would of course need to be modified as part of the
reconceptualization that I suggest in the text.
Michael Hamilton had the initial insight that the question of true sale versus secured loan is
a false dichotomy, with all of the seeming exactness of Linnaean taxonomy but none of its sup-
pleness.  See Michael D. Hamilton, True Sale, Recourse and Taxonomy (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law).  Although current
doctrine treats the true sale question as depending not just on the level of recourse but also on
other factors, see STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 14, at 183–85, these other factors can also be
accommodated within the structure of a graded category.  See, e.g., STEVEN L. WINTER, A
CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE AND MIND 139–65 (2001) (arguing that the results in
seemingly conflicting right-to-counsel cases are in fact harmonized by the convergence of three
graded categories).
The concept of graded categories sheds light on project finance as well as securitization,
and on other commercial transactions too, at the much more general level of the category that
we call ”consensual transaction.”  See infra Part IV.
20. For discussions of the procedures used in setting up SPVs, see Bjerre, supra note 10, at
265 & nn.17–18 and sources cited there.
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typically provide for maximum flexibility,21 the charters of SPVs pro-
vide for the entity to have only those powers that are necessary to ac-
complish the purpose of the transaction.  The reason for these restric-
tions is to keep the risk of the SPV’s own bankruptcy as narrow as
possible: the smaller the range of the entity’s activities, the smaller
the range of consensual and non-consensual creditors it will have, and
the smaller the risk of a bankruptcy.
But while the purpose of the restrictions is the same in both pat-
terns of transaction, the range of those restrictions is dramatically dif-
ferent.  The SPV in a securitization will have the power only to pur-
chase the particular receivables contemplated by the transaction,
issue the related capital market securities, make payments thereon,
and so on, while the SPV in a project finance transaction (often also
called the project company) will have the power only to build the
project, operate it, make loan repayments, and so on.  The range of
activity of the project finance SPV is clearly much broader than that
of the securitization SPV.  Compared to the tightly limited activities
of a securitization SPV, the SPV in a project finance transaction really
isn’t very “special” at all: its powers extend to having employees,
owning land, building on that land, and even operating heavy, dan-
gerous machinery—all of which generates a prospect of creditors
(consensual or nonconsensual, contract-based or tort-based), and ac-
cordingly of bankruptcy, broad enough to give a securitization lawyer
nightmares.22
Contrary to what one might think from a study of securitizations
alone (or from a purely abstract description of structured finance in
general), then, the difference between a full-blown, freely operating,
bankruptcy-prone business enterprise such as a securitization origina-
tor, on one hand, and an SPV, on the other hand, is a difference in
degree rather than a difference in kind.  The project finance SPV is
similar to the securitization SPV in that it is the locus in which assets
are isolated, and in that its activities are limited to protect against its
own bankruptcy.  But the project finance SPV is also similar to the
seemingly opposite pole, the originator in a securitization, in that its
21. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (1998) (permitting charter to provide that
corporation’s purpose is “to engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations may be
organized under the General Corporation Law of Delaware”).
22. This relatively non-special nature of a project finance SPV highlights the fact (already
noted, and developed in Part III below) that project finance transactions have a more readily
visible effect than do securitizations on non-consenting third parties: the greater visibility of ef-
fect is mirrored by the greater range of activity of the SPV.
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activities are substantial and robust, and that there is therefore a re-
alistic prospect of its bankruptcy.
This similarity between project companies and their odd
bedfellows, securitization originators, means that the former are natu-
ral candidates for treatment as the latter.  Given that project finance
receivables, even when isolated from the sponsor in the project com-
pany, remain substantially exposed to the bankruptcy of the project
company, why not enhance project finance transactions with a securi-
tization component, treating a project company as a securitization
originator that sells its receivables (in a true sale, of course) to an
SPV of its own?  This SPV of an SPV would issue capital market se-
curities, using the resulting funds to pay for its purchase of the receiv-
ables.  At the bottom line, the project’s receivables would be insu-
lated not only from the risk of the bankruptcy of the sponsors, as is
ordinary today, but also from the risk that, in a bankruptcy of the
project company itself, the receivables will be treated as property of
the project company’s estate.  Deals like this have, in fact, begun to
emerge as an apparently viable technique, though of course a very
costly one.23  The two structures are agglutinated, or affixed to each
other with a single point of intersection, and as a result, the securitiza-
tion element of the deals solves a weakness in the project finance
element of the deals.
C. A Glance at Other Points of Comparison
The receivables in a project finance transaction are ordinarily
payable by only one or a very small number of obligors or off-take
purchasers, for example, the government utility that has contracted to
buy the output of a power plant project, or the natural gas utilities
that have contracted to pay for the services of a pipeline project.  By
contrast, the receivables in a securitization transaction are ordinarily
23. Heretofore the transactions have taken the form of multi-originator conduit transac-
tions and, notably for the subject of this Symposium, the project finance transactions being fed
into the conduits have included projects in emerging markets.  See Returning for more, PROJECT
FIN., Apr. 1999, at 24; see also J. Paul Forrester et al., Securitization of Project Finance Loans
and Other Private Sector Infrastructure Loans, FINANCIER: ACMT, Feb. 1994, at 7, 7–10; What
heats the hot seat, PROJECT FIN., Nov. 1999, at 29 (securitization of equity dividends on power
plants).
Beyond the bankruptcy protection described in the text, these conduit structures are also
attractive because they provide investors with the diversification inherent in having receivables
from many projects rather than just one.  This diversification is a further way in which the con-
duit structures resemble prototypical securitization transactions.  See infra note 24.
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payable by a large number of obligors.24  However, nothing in princi-
ple prevents a project finance transaction from having a high number
of obligors,25 or a securitization transaction from having a low number
of high dollar value obligors.
Other points of commonality between the two patterns of trans-
action are numerous.  From the standpoint of commercial law, both
patterns of transaction depend heavily on property interests in the re-
ceivables to which the lenders look for payment.26  From the stand-
point of other law, too, both patterns of transaction draw deeply from
the same wells: both implicate important questions about, for exam-
ple, raising funds in public markets,27 the power and treatment of
trusts,28 and choice of entity,29 to say nothing of the need for exhaus-
24. The limitations on recourse discussed in Part I.A cause the securitization investors,
rather than the originators, to bear the risk of non-payment by these obligors, but their large
number tends, in effect, to create a diversified portfolio, which mitigates the risk.
25. In fact, some project finance transactions effectively have innumerable obligors, none
of whom however are bound by contract.  For example, in a toll road project, the lenders will
look for repayment to the small tolls paid by the road’s users (as well as, in some cases, subsidies
that the host country is contractually obligated to pay).
The term “host country” is usually used simply to denote the country in which a project op-
erates, and in keeping with general usage I will do the same in this essay, but the term also has a
non-neutral rhetorical dimension that should not be ignored.  See infra note 83 and accompa-
nying text.
26. In a project finance transaction, the property interest is simply a security interest, while
in a securitization transaction, the property interest is an outright ownership interest, though
under U.S. commercial law (as opposed to bankruptcy law) that ownership interest would be
governed by the same regime as a security interest, i.e. U.C.C. Article 9.  See U.C.C. § 1-201(37)
(2000) (defining an owner’s interest in an account, chattel paper, instrument or payment intan-
gible as a security interest).  This lumping together for terminological convenience of two con-
cepts (based though it is on structural similarity, see supra note 15 and accompanying text)
should not be misconstrued as a declaration that there is no substantive difference between the
two.  See, e.g., Thomas E. Plank, When a sale of accounts is not a sale: a critique of Octagon Gas,
48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 45 (1994); Thomas E. Plank, Sacred Cows and Workhorses: The
Sale of Accounts and Chattel Paper under the UCC and the Effects of Violating a Fundamental
Drafting Principle, 26 CONN. L. REV. 397 (1994) (also criticizing the Octagon Gas Systems case);
Steven L. Schwarcz, ‘Octagon Gas’ Ruling Creates Turmoil for Commercial and Asset-Based
Finance, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 4, 1993, at 1.  But see David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of
Securitization, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1059 (1998) (arguing “that, in spite of the hue
and cry through the streets of corporate finance, the Octagon Gas case was decided rightly: on
its facts, its dictum, and its policy implications”).
U.C.C. § 9-318(a) overrules the Octagon case, albeit in a less than satisfying way.  It de-
clares that the seller of a receivable has no interest in the receivable sold, but this is not neces-
sarily accurate as a simple factual matter.  For example, if an originator has accepted a small
level of recourse limited to historical default levels, that originator retains pro tanto an interest
in the receivables sold.  See supra notes 13–19 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note 11, at 107, 431.
28. Id. at 77.  Aspects of certain trust-related questions in U.C.C. Article 9 are discussed in
Bjerre, supra note 10, at 303–06.
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tively foresightful contract drafting.  Moreover, in the international
context, both patterns of transaction are concerned with legal tech-
niques for managing currency risks,30 enforceability of contractual
choice of law and choice of forum clauses, enforcement of foreign
judgments, and the choice of law under which conflicts with third par-
ties over property interests in the receivables will be adjudicated.31
In sum, from a practical standpoint, the legal apparatuses of the
two patterns of transaction have almost everything in common, other
than the basic structural differences discussed above.  And even these
structural differences tend to be differences in degree rather than dif-
ferences in kind: ranges of levels of recourse, the range of trueness
that ought to be recognized in a sale of receivables, and degrees of re-
striction on the activities of SPVs, to name only some of those dis-
cussed above.  In fact, even the basic term “structured finance trans-
action” stands revealed as a matter of degree rather than a matter of
absolutes—project finance fits less well into the category of struc-
tured finance than does securitization, because of the vulnerability to
bankruptcy of project finance SPVs.32
Taken as a whole, the pervasiveness of these ranges of gray is in-
structive in itself, particularly in high-pressure, Wall Street deals such
as these, in which certainty is at a premium.  The point is not, obvi-
ously, that there is no difference between the two patterns of transac-
tion, but rather that the seemingly clear-cut nature of those differ-
ences is illusory: clear-cut language often fails to do justice to the
complexity of the world that it purports to mirror.33  In the remainder
of this essay I lay the groundwork for concluding that the same is true
of another linguistic label, “consensual transaction.”
II.  ANTI-ASSIGNMENT CLAUSES AND
THE PROBLEM OF CONSENT
Project finance and securitization transactions also hold in com-
mon a number of commercial law doctrines, among which I focus
29. See, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note 11, at 121–36.
30. Id. at 55–82.
31. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The Universal Language of Cross-Border Finance, 8
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 235 (1998).
32. See supra Part I.B.
33. Great advances on this subject have recently been made in cognitive linguistics and re-
lated fields.  For important work in this area, see generally WINTER, supra note 19; LAKOFF,
supra note 17.  I develop some of these ideas in the context of the meanings of the term “prop-
erty” in an earlier article.  See Carl S. Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out: Negative Pledge
Covenants, Property and Perfection, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 353–64 (1999).
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here on the invalidation of anti-assignment clauses.  I choose to dis-
cuss this doctrine here because it raises important questions of con-
sent versus coercion, and thus relates thematically to the broader so-
cial questions raised in Part III and to my questioning of the
soundness of the categorical label “consensual transaction.”34  Much
more is at stake here than a question of English usage or even of cog-
nition: too facile a use of the label “consensual” can help to lull one
into a sense of false comfort about the real impact of these transac-
tions.
Consider the following two scenarios:
(a) An oil drilling company wishes to securitize its rights to re-
ceive payment for crude oil sold to large oil refineries.  How-
ever, the agreements representing those receivables contain
anti-assignment clauses: the refineries benefit from a clause
in the sales agreements providing that the drilling company
will not sell or assign its rights without the consent of the re-
fineries.  The refineries had good reasons for insisting on
such a clause: for example, the refineries may have chosen to
buy from this drilling company because their long-term,
multi-faceted relationship with the drilling company gives
them comfort about the drilling company’s willingness to
waive minor defaults.35  But if the anti-assignment clause is
enforced, the securitization cannot go forward.
(b) A host government signs a contract obligating itself to pur-
chase the power or minerals, or to subsidize the rail or toll-
road usage, that a proposed project will generate, and the
host government’s creditworthiness thus becomes the linch-
pin of the project’s financing.  The contract contains an anti-
assignment clause, prohibiting the project company from as-
signing its rights under the contract to a third party (other
than the collateral agent acting on behalf of the lenders36)
without the host government’s consent.  After a dispute with
the host government, the lenders seek to extricate themselves
34. Other commercial law doctrines that raise parallel questions are explored, along with
something more of their philosophical background, in a forthcoming article.  See Carl S. Bjerre,
Commerce and Community: The Redistributionist Streak in Commercial Law (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law).
35. For discussion of other reasons for which obligors may be justified in valuing anti-
assignment clauses, see HOFFMAN, supra note 11, at 581; Bjerre, supra note 10, at 292–93.
36. This assumes that the off-take contract is being drafted with a view to the rest of the
project finance transaction.  As discussed infra notes 42–43 and accompanying text, this is not
always the case.
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from the transaction by assigning their rights to other lend-
ers.37
Both of these scenarios involve a confrontation between two
deeply held social values: freedom of contract, which would protect
the refineries or the host government, and freedom of alienation,
which would enable the securitization or the assignment of the off-
take contract.  Superficially, this conflict may seem easy to resolve in
a way that involves no affront to the ideal of consensuality in business
transactions: uphold the restriction on alienation in each case.  Nei-
ther the securitization nor the lenders’ assignment could then go for-
ward, but in each case the constrained party would have no one to
blame but itself, having consented to the constraints beforehand.  The
drilling company’s and lenders’ freedom of alienation would be sub-
ordinate to contract.
But such a consent-based resolution to the conflict is not the one
that U.S. law, at least, generally takes, and as the law of other coun-
tries develops, one can expect it similarly to depart from such a reso-
lution.38  For several decades already, U.C.C. Article 9 has overridden
37. Though these are not the facts of Enron Corporation’s ill-fated Dabhol power project,
that imbroglio shows that the scenario in the text is perfectly realistic.  See, e.g., Manjeet
Kripalani, India Needs a Big Jolt of Energy Reform, BUS. WK., Dec. 3, 2001, at 38, 38 (describ-
ing transaction history culminating in Enron’s efforts to sell its “Indian albatross”).
If the identity of the collateral agent, and not just of the lenders represented by that agent,
would change as the result of the lenders’ assignment, then clearly the enforceability of the anti-
assignment clause is crucial.  But even if the identity of the collateral agent would be unchanged,
the enforceability of the anti-assignment clause cannot be ignored.  The argument that no real
assignment takes place when the collateral agent remains the same is superficial and formalistic,
particularly in light of the fact that the collateral agent takes its directions from the lenders that
it represents.  (U.C.C. Article 9’s filing provisions generally do not address such assignments, see
Bjerre, supra note 10, at 303–06, but this fact is irrelevant to the anti-assignment clause point.)
38. See, e.g., U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL), LEGISLATIVE GUIDE
ON PRIVATELY FINANCED INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.B/4, U.N.
Sales No. E.01.V.4 (2001) [hereinafter UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE], at 120 ¶ 57 (tacitly
recommending measures to permit the granting of security interests notwithstanding restrictions
on assignment).  On December 12, 2001, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution
opening for signature the UNCITRAL Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in Inter-
national Trade.  Article 9 of this Convention also overrides anti-assignment clauses.  United Na-
tions Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade, opened for signature
Dec. 12, 2001, G.A. Res, 56/81, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., art. 9(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/81
(2002), available at http://www.uncitral.org/stable/res5681-e.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2002)
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Convention].  Unlike U.C.C. Article 9, the UNCITRAL Convention
does not affect the liability of the assignor for breach.  Id. art. 9(2).  The provision reaches only
a defined (but nonetheless quite broad) class of receivables, notably those arising from contracts
for the supply or lease of goods or non-financial services, those arising from contracts for the
license of intellectual property, and those representing the payment obligation for a credit card
transaction.  Id. art. 9(3).  Countries adopting the Convention would, however, be able to opt
out of the invalidation of anti-assignment clauses in cases (such as scenario (b) in the text
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anti-assignment clauses in certain accounts receivable,39 and in the
course of the statute’s recent overhaul, this overriding of anti-
assignment clauses has been vastly expanded, so that it now covers a
much greater range of personal property.40  The result is to elevate
freedom of alienation over freedom of contract, making collateral
available that would not be otherwise, and thus enabling transactions
to take place that otherwise might not.  From a utilitarian standpoint,
at least, the results may ultimately be justifiable, but they are also
quite troubling: they impose a result on a party (the refineries or the
host government, in the scenarios above) to which that party did not
above) where the government itself is the obligor on the receivable—a concession that stands as
testimony to the importance of the effectiveness of anti-assignment clauses.  Id. art. 40.  See gen-
erally Spiros V. Bazinas, Lowering the Cost of Credit: The Promise in the Future UNCITRAL
Convention on Assignment of Receivables in International Trade, 9 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
259 (2001); Spiros V. Bazinas, Multi-Jurisdictional Receivables Financing: UNCITRAL’s Impact
on Securitization and Cross-Border Perfection, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 365 (2002); Michel
Deschamps, The Priority Rules of the United Nations Receivables Convention, 12 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 389 (2002); Bruce A. Markell, UNCITRAL’s Receivables Convention: The
First Step, But Not the Last, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 401 (2002); Harry C. Sigman & Edwin
E. Smith, The Draft UNCITRAL Convention on Assignment of Receivables in International
Trade: A Summary of the Key Provisions as Completion Draws Near, 33 UCC L.J. 344 (2001).
39. U.C.C. § 9-318(4) (1994).
40. U.C.C. §§ 9-406, 9-407, 9-408, 9-409 (2000).  For example, terms restricting the aliena-
tion of permits, licenses, franchise rights, and the like are now invalidated as well, and these are
measures with potentially strong bearing on project finance transactions, which are heavily de-
pendent on governmental permits.  In many of the applications of the rule as broadened, how-
ever, an important exception to the rule will also apply.  The exception provides that, despite
the overriding of the anti-assignment restrictions, the assignee does not have the right to fore-
close on the rights assigned or otherwise exercise rights against the party imposing the restric-
tion.  See U.C.C. §§ 9-408(d), 9-409(b) (2000); Bjerre, supra note 10, at 296 & n.165, 301 &
n.186; Thomas E. Plank, The Limited Security Interest in Non-Assignable Collateral Under Re-
vised Article 9, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 323, 327–39 (2001).  Though this exception does
not generally rob the main override rule of its force from the point of view of the secured party
(for example, the secured party will still benefit from the value of the proceeds of the restricted
property in bankruptcy, see U.C.C. § 9-408 cmt. 7 (2000)), it does remove the taint of non-
consensuality from those applications of the broadened rule.  (Even here, however, to the ex-
tent one accepts the arguments made on behalf of unsecured creditors against securitization, see
infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text, one can make similar arguments against the new over-
ride rules.  To the extent the secured party is able to harness the value of the restricted asset in a
bankruptcy proceeding, the unsecured creditors are arguably harmed.)
Revised Article 9 nonetheless represents a further step beyond former Article 9 down the
road of non-consensuality, in the substantial number of cases in which the overriding of anti-
assignment restrictions has been broadened without the countervailing exception described
above.  For example, no countervailing exception mitigates the effect of the rule on the sale or
pledge of accounts, and the definition of account has been greatly broadened.  The rule also
now applies, without any countervailing exception, to promissory notes and chattel paper, in
each case when the transaction is a pledge rather than a sale.  And in all of these cases, as well
as in former Article 9’s accounts and general intangibles cases, restrictions on assignment im-
posed by law rather than contract are now invalidated, too.
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consent, and against which, indeed, it affirmatively sought to protect
itself.41
The issue has broader importance to project finance transactions
than the foregoing scenarios alone might imply.  For example, when
the transaction involves the privatization of a project that formerly
was publicly operated,42 the off-take contract typically will already be
in place, and as a result (unlike in the second scenario), not even the
assignment of rights to the collateral agent will be permitted by the
contract’s terms, and unless the anti-assignment clause is overridden,
the financing cannot go forward.43  As another example, even if the
assignment to the collateral agent is not problematic, there remains
the issue of an eventual assignment by the collateral agent to a post-
default purchaser of the project.44  (Foreclosures are much more un-
usual in project finance transactions than are workouts,45 but the as-
signment upon foreclosure issue remains nonetheless, representing
the background entitlements against which workout negotiations are
conducted.46)  And finally, because all of the key contracts of a project
are generally a part of the collateral package, the anti-assignment is-
sue also affects contracts wholly apart from the off-take contract.47
41. In Commerce and Community, supra note 34, I root this dilemma in the broader con-
flict between the libertarian and utilitarian philosophical traditions.
42. Particularly with the move of many economies from centrally planned to market-driven
models, privatization has become an important facet of the project finance world.  See, e.g.,
Loren Page Ambinder et al., The Mirage Becomes Reality: Privatization and Project Finance
Developments in the Middle East Power Market, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1029 (2001); Chasing
Power Deals, PROJECT FIN., July 10, 1999, at 26, 26 (quoting an observer as saying that the trend
in privatizing infrastructure “is moving around the world”).
43. An alternative to overriding the clause, of course, would be for the off-take purchaser
simply to consent to the assignment.  In a context such as this, however, the off-take purchaser
would be tempted to withhold its consent with a view to extracting unfairly large compensation.
44. “[I]n the event of foreclosure, the contracts must be assumable by the lender and as-
signable to a post-default purchaser of the project.  Otherwise, the lender may have little ability
to recover its unpaid loans, since few projects have value without the underlying project con-
tracts, particularly the off-take contract.”  HOFFMAN, supra note 11, at 511.
45. As Hoffman points out, foreclosure only makes sense if the project as a whole, includ-
ing the crucial contracts, is being sold as a package.  Id. at 512.  As one wit observed in describ-
ing the workout negotiations over the Euro Disney project, “there is not much of a market for
second-hand, mechanical teacups.”  Meltdown at the Cultural Chernobyl, ECONOMIST, Feb. 5,
1994, at 65, 66.  On renegotiation and workouts in project finance generally, see Jeswald W. Sa-
lacuse, Renegotiating International Project Agreements, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1319 (2001).
46. See, e.g., Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
47. Contracts other than the off-take contract, such as those between the project company
and raw materials suppliers or facilities construction companies, face another problem.  The
relatively smaller scale of such contracts (and sometimes the lesser sophistication of the coun-
terparty) can make it impractical for the parties to negotiate in advance for ideally contoured
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III.  THE PROBLEM OF CONSENT WRIT LARGE: THE
SOCIAL IMPACT OF PROJECT FINANCE TRANSACTIONS
As observed above,48 securitization is paradigmatically an im-
provement to the financing of an existing business operation, while by
sharp contrast, project finance transactions paradigmatically involve
not the improvement of an existing enterprise but the creation of a
new one.  And because the new enterprise thus created represents an
addition to the host country’s power, transportation, telecommunica-
tions, or other infrastructure, that new enterprise has deep and broad
effects on that country in several respects, potentially including the
country’s economy, politics, culture, and environment, as well as
other aspects of its daily life.  In short, project finance is a but-for
condition of many major enterprises, while securitization is not, and
project finance transactions accordingly tend to have a more readily
visible, more highly dramatic social impact than do securitization
transactions.49
International project finance transactions are a form of foreign
direct investment (commonly called FDI), as opposed to portfolio in-
vestment: they involve the direct acquisition and control of hard as-
sets abroad, and they thus represent a continuing stake in the foreign
nation, as opposed to the generally more transient acquisition of
shares of stock, bonds, or commercial paper of foreign enterprises.50
As such, international project finance transactions are inextricably
linked to the longstanding controversies over FDI’s effects on devel-
exceptions to the anti-assignment clauses.  By the same token, the workaday goals of anti-
assignment clauses may be all the more important to the smaller counterparties.  See Bjerre, su-
pra note 10, at 292–93 (describing bookkeeping and double payment concerns that, in addition
to relationship concerns, can make anti-assignment clauses important).
48. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
49. As noted at the outset of this essay, many other types of business transactions can have
a similarly dramatic social impact, but project finance is a natural starting place for the discus-
sion.  The word “dramatic” here should be taken in the sense of striking or attention-getting
rather than, necessarily, the alternative sense of enormous.  The impacts of securitization and
other forms of financing, while very generally less visible and striking, are potentially as enor-
mous as that of project finance.
50. One could attempt to argue that just as project finance is a form of FDI, securitization
is a form of portfolio investment. This analogy holds to the extent that securitizations involve
the acquisition neither of hard assets nor of control over business operations, but it is imperfect
to the extent that the true sale aspect of these transactions, see supra note 8 and accompanying
text, prevents the capital from being simply pulled out of the foreign country on a moment’s no-
tice (unlike in the case of the portfolio investments involved in, for example, the Asian eco-
nomic crisis of the late 1990s).  The fast-pay events and commitment terminations that are often
a feature of securitization transactions do not fully rescue the analogy, because they are trig-
gered only by restricted sets of events.
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oping nations.51  The strength of these controversies is attributable
almost entirely to the fact that the transactions have such strong ef-
fects on third parties and on the host country as a whole, reaching far
beyond the immediate parties to the transaction.
The positive aspects of these third-party effects are undeniable
and obvious.  The transactions create jobs,52 bring technology and
know-how into the host country,53 help contribute toward a better-
trained, better-educated work force,54 and, of course, often result in
the providing to the population of core services such as power or
transportation.  In short, they stimulate the economy and lead to eco-
nomic growth.  None of this should be slighted.  However, as Amar-
tya Sen writes in Development as Freedom, “Without ignoring the
importance of economic growth, we must look well beyond it.”55
Sen’s book makes a powerful moral and philosophical case for evalu-
ating the industrialization of developing economies not just in terms
of material well-being, but also in terms of what he calls the popula-
tion’s “capabilities.”56  Under this rubric he places factors such as
having a political voice,57 being educated,58 having civil liberties,59 be-
ing free to live on traditional lands without displacement,60 and other
effects on traditional lifestyles.  Sen generally argues that the point of
development is to increase not just economic well-being but also
freedom, with freedom being understood in a substantive sense rather
than in the libertarian, proceduralist sense.61
51. For general reading on FDI controversies, see THEODORE H. MORAN, FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: THE NEW POLICY AGENDA FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES AND ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION (1998); MICHAEL P. TODARO, ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 582–88 (2000); Eduardo Borensztein et al., How Does Foreign Direct Invest-
ment Affect Economic Growth?, 45 J. INT’L ECON. 115 (1998).
52. Among these are jobs in construction and other front-end aspects of the project; jobs in
supplying the raw materials purchased by the project; jobs enabled by the power or other prod-
ucts created by the project; jobs in operating the project when complete, and so on.  But see in-
fra note 63.
53. Technology and training are accepted as crucial engines to the development of econo-
mies.
54. However, in many instances project sponsors may import their own expertise.  See, e.g.,
HOFFMAN, supra note 11, at 49–50.
55. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 14 (1999).  Sen was awarded the Nobel
Prize in economics in 1998.
56. See, e.g., id. at 18, 292–94.
57. See, e.g., id. at 149–59.
58. See, e.g., id. at 128–29.
59. See, e.g., id. at 148–49.
60. See, e.g., id. at 142–43.
61. Id. at 66.
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Sen does not direct explicit attention to project finance transac-
tions, but a moment’s reflection makes obvious that these transac-
tions can have powerful effects on many of the substantive freedoms
with which Sen is concerned.  Briefly to signal just a few of these ef-
fects, projects may widen wage differentials, increase the disparity be-
tween rural and urban job opportunities and thus exacerbate rural-to-
urban migration, displace populations that have lived for generations
at, for example, a dam or mining project site, and strengthen the
power of governments that may be restrictive of a population’s free-
dom to dissent.  Projects can cause severe environmental effects (par-
ticularly projects in the dam, transportation, power, and mining sec-
tors).62  Governments intent on attracting project investments
(particularly in countries where the population lacks a strong political
voice) may award subsidies, tax breaks, and social services to spon-
sors even at the expense of funding anti-poverty or other needed so-
cial programs.63
This essay is not the place for an in-depth examination of par-
ticular cases, but a copper and gold mining project operating at the
headwaters of the Ok Tedi River in the Western Province of Papua
New Guinea provides one example of the network of social effects
that can be at stake.  The project’s operators proclaim that the project
has had a number of favorable effects on the area,64 but another side
of the coin, according to published reports, is that the continuous
62. See, e.g., infra note 64 and accompanying text.  Though Sen in Development as Freedom
pays little attention to the subjects of safety and healthfulness of the natural environment, these
seem clearly to belong on the list of substantive freedoms with which Sen’s capabilities approach
is concerned.
63. Another of Sen’s central capabilities concerns is education, and the question of project
finance’s impact in this regard is a complicated and perhaps contrary one.  As noted above,
project finance transactions tend to bring technology and know-how into the host country and
can entail at least some training of local workers in it.  See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying
text.  On the other hand, this factor is neutralized to the extent that a project sponsor imports its
own trained staff, and the presence of that imported expertise can even stifle the impetus for
education that would otherwise exist.  See, e.g., TODARO, supra note 51, at 584; see also Cath-
erine Pédamon, How is Convergence Best Achieved in International Project Finance?, 24
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1272, 1312 (2001) (noting that the UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, su-
pra note 38, “does not, for instance, provide for the placement of a minimum amount of work
with local contractors”).
64. The project’s publicly available materials state that its operations “have made a signifi-
cant contribution to the Western Province not only economically but by providing community
infrastructure (roads, airstrips, water and communications systems), education and training,
employment and health services,” as well as community development and business development
programs to build a foundation for the community’s future prosperity when the mine closes.  See
OK TEDI Mining, OTML at a Glance, at http://www.oktedi.com/aboutus/index.php (last visited
Mar. 5, 2002).
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dumping of mine tailage into the region’s river systems has killed
large stretches of forest, with effects that reach far beyond the envi-
ronment per se.  According to the Executive Director of the Austra-
lian Conservation Foundation,
In a country like [Papua New Guinea], social and environmental is-
sues are inextricably linked.  Most people living rurally are subsis-
tence farmers who depend on a healthy natural environment for
survival.  Some local communities have welcomed the financial
benefits and the consequent changes to their lifestyle.  On the other
hand, . . . other communities are far less welcoming.  For these peo-
ple, the loss of forests and crops to flooding and the loss of fish
stocks has seen traditional sources of food disappear.  Many areas
of deep spiritual value for villagers are now submerged in mine
tailings.  Some local people see the mine as culturally destructive,
threatening the integrity of their heritage and identity.65
When the project’s sponsors moved to terminate its operations earlier
than scheduled, the national government resisted, presumably be-
cause the mine accounts for about ten percent of the country’s gross
domestic product.66
Dynamics such as this also highlight the fact that the interests of
a developing country’s government may not always be closely aligned
with those of its population.  The population of Papua New Guinea,
which is part of the British Commonwealth, benefits from a demo-
cratic form of government,67 but of course much of the population of
the developing world does not.68  The widely-known case of the Three
65. Don Henry, Leaving the Scene of the Mine, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Dec. 28, 2001, available
at 2001 WL 31902107.
66. Successors Line Up for Ok Tedi, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Dec. 2, 2000, available at
2000 WL 30110458.
67. Questions have nonetheless been raised about the degree to which the population af-
fected by the Ok Tedi project has consented to it.
The PNG government claims that 138 of the required 149 villages have already signed
the agreements [relating to continuation of the mining operations], but [a member of
Parliament from the region said that the project company] handpicked people to sign
on behalf of their villages.  “There has been no consultation with the people.  More
than 1,500 people have already sent affidavits to the Supreme Court saying no one was
authorized to sign any agreements with [the sponsor] on their behalf,” he said.
Legal Challenge Against PNG Government Bill on Ok Tedi Mine, PAC. ISLANDS BROADCAST
ASS’N NEWS SERV., Dec. 14, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2825048.
Enron’s Dabhol power plant project in India shows that democratic forces can sometimes
serve as something of a safeguard: in the 1995 Maharashtra state elections, the issue became
such a focal point of controversy that it helped to push the incumbent party from power.  See,
e.g., Enron in India, Generation Gaps, ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 2001, at 62; Salacuse, supra note 45,
at 1351.  In many cases, however, a project’s effects will fall primarily on a minority and democ-
racy will not be a panacea.
68. According to one institutional observer, as of 2001, 2.157 billion people live in societies
where “the political process is tightly controlled and basic freedoms are denied,” an additional
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Gorges Dam on China’s Yang Tze River is an all too powerful exam-
ple.  When the journalist Dai Qing published a volume69 protesting,
among other things, the project’s projected displacement of well over
one million inhabitants70 and its incalculable harm to Neolithic and
Qing Dynasty archeological sites,71 the Chinese government banned
the book and imprisoned her for ten months.72  Moreover, of course,
even in a transparently democratic system, the voices of those who
are directly affected by a project do not necessarily prevail, and those
voices cannot even begin to be heard unless supported by certain
minimal levels of literacy and material wherewithal.
Sen’s analysis applies (though in less urgent form) to developed
countries as well,73 and by recalling two well-known Western Euro-
pean project finance transactions, we can discern instructive parallels
to some of the foregoing concerns.  First, the Channel Tunnel, which
provides the first land crossing from Europe to England since the Ice
Age and has been described as “the largest project finance operation
of the 20th century,”74 is well known to have deeply disturbed the
English (quite apart from having hurt nearby land values, triggered
protests by English fruit growers, and the like) by damaging the
physical and cultural insularity that had always been one of the coun-
try’s points of pride.75  And second, the Euro Disney theme park in
1.435 billion people live in societies characterized by “some restrictions on political rights and
civil liberties, often in a context of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic strife or civil war,” and
the vast majority of both groups are concentrated in the developing regions of Asia and Africa.
Freedom House, The Map of Freedom 2001, available at www.freedomhouse.org/pdf_docs/
research/freeworld/2001/map2001.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2002).
69. DAI QING, YANGTZE!  YANGTZE! (Nancy Liu et al. trans., 1994) (1989).
70. See, e.g., Philip M. Fearnside, Resettlement Plans for China’s Three Gorges Dam, in
DAMMING THE THREE GORGES 34 (Margaret Barber & Gráinne Ryder eds., 2d ed. 1993); Fang
Zongdai & Wang Shouzhong, Resettlement Problem of the Three Gorges Project, in
MEGAPROJECT: A CASE STUDY OF CHINA’S THREE GORGES PROJECT 176 (Shiu-Hung Luk &
Joseph Whitney eds., 1993).
71. See, e.g., Dai Qing, The Danger to Historical Relics and Cultural Antiquities In and
Around the Three Gorges Area: Interviews with the Director of the National History Museum of
China, Yu Weichao, in THE RIVER DRAGON HAS COME! 124 (Dai Qing et al. eds., Yi Ming
trans., 1998) (1998); Letter to Jiang Zemin Concerning Archeological Sites (Aug. 8, 1996), in
THE RIVER DRAGON HAS COME!, supra, app. F, at 214.
72. Audrey Ronning Topping, Foreword, THE RIVER DRAGON HAS COME!, supra note 71,
at xv, xxv.
73. SEN, supra note 55, at 6, 15, 20–24.
74. Richard Evans, Financing the Channel Tunnel, EUROMONEY, Mar. 1986, at 13, 13.
75. See, e.g., DREW FETHERSTON, THE CHUNNEL: THE AMAZING STORY OF THE
UNDERSEA CROSSING OF THE ENGLISH CHANNEL (1997); Leigh Montville, Invasion on Wheels,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 18, 1994, at 40, 41 (Tour de France penetrates England via Channel
Tunnel and is viewed as invasion); Daniel Pederson, Why Do Brits Hate the Chunnel?,
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Marne-la-Vallée, near Paris, has been widely reviled by Europeans
seeking to resist what they see as American cultural imperialism.76
Obviously, neither of these European projects raises issues compara-
ble in starkness or severity to the voting rights, population stability,
and other issues that are Sen’s most pressing concerns,77 but the
European projects may nonetheless help bring home to Western ob-
servers, if only by weak analogy, the reality and immediacy of Sen’s
issues, which in their geographic and cultural specificity might other-
wise seem to be elusive or comfortably remote.78  Even these rela-
tively bland European examples have raised notable social turmoil,
and these are only echoes of the more intense upheaval that can be at
stake in their developing-world counterparts.
Sen’s several capabilities-based concerns are united by the con-
ceptual thread of free agency.  The word “agency” is derived from the
Latin for “to act” or “to do,”79 and though traditional Western law
thinks of agency in the more restrictive sense of one person acting for
NEWSWEEK, May 9, 1994, at 43, 43 (quoting Prime Minister Palmerston as rejecting an 1858
tunnel proposal because it would “shorten a distance we already find too short”); Christopher
Redman, An Island No More, TIME, Nov. 12, 1990, at 49, 49.  As one commentator writes,
nowhere is [the Channel Tunnel] less loved than in communities around Dover on the
southeast coast of England . . . . By and large, people in the area . . . abhor the sprawl-
ing terminal building that scars the town of Folkstone, do not want the new roads and
high-speed railway lines that will cut through the countryside to link the Chunnel with
London, and shudder at the prospect of bringing the European continent closer to their
island, even if only psychologically.
Bruce Wallace, Tunnel Vision, MACLEAN’S, May 9, 1994, at 29, 29 (emphasis added).
76. See, e.g., Euro Disney: The not-so-magic kingdom, ECONOMIST, Sept. 26, 1992, at 87, 88
(reporting that French intellectuals call park a “cultural Chernobyl”); John McGrath, The law-
yers who rebuilt EuroDisney, INT’L FIN. L. REV., May 1994, at 10, 11 (describing the project’s
effects on “cultural sensibilities of Europeans, who were happy to visit Disney in the US but
reluctant to consume American culture at home”); Jolie Solomon, Mickey’s Trip to Trouble,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 14, 1994, at 34, 34 (“Despite howls from the intelligentsia about Disney’s
threat to French culture, France had laid out the red carpet.”).  One writer describes French in-
tellectuals as chorusing that Euro Disney was “just the latest example of American cultural im-
perialism that had appropriated European myths and fairy tales and was now selling back to
Europe in sanitized form,” and reports that “[n]ot all the opposition was verbal: hours before
the opening, saboteurs blew up an electricity pylon and plunged much of the complex into dark-
ness.”  Andrew Phillips, Where’s the Magic?, MACLEAN’S, May 3, 1993, at 47, 47.  See generally
ANDREW LAINSBURY, ONCE UPON AN AMERICAN DREAM: THE STORY OF EURO
DISNEYLAND (2000).
77. See supra notes 55–63 and accompanying text.
78. Other modern Western parallels to these concerns might include the not-in-my-
backyard opposition to power plants that is now familiar in the United States, the popular
mourning of small businesses’ surrender to so-called big-box retailers, and the firestorm of cul-
tural opposition that was provoked by a second Disney venture.  See Jolie Solomon, A Sudden
Surrender in Virginia, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 10, 1994, at 46, 46 (reporting on the demise of Disney’s
plans for an American-themed park near Virginia’s most hallowed Civil War battlefields).
79. See THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 19 (C. T. Onions ed., 1966).
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another, perhaps this is only because we have generally been able to
take for granted our power to act for ourselves in the first place.80  In
other cultures, burdened with severe material privations or lacking
strong traditions of freedom from governmental imposition, the ques-
tion of agency is the much more basic one of acting on one’s own be-
half at all, as opposed to being acted upon against one’s will.  Project
finance transactions, though privately funded, affect the public at
large,81 and regardless of whether the project’s effects in any given
case constitute a net benefit or a net detriment, those effects are often
imposed against the will of much of that public.82  (In this light, the
very term “host country” becomes problematic: the term carries
metaphorical implications of a close, genuinely consensual, mutually
rewarding and terminable-at-will relationship between the country
and the sponsors, but as we begin to see when looking through Sen’s
eyes, this rhetorical freight may not always be entirely legitimate.83)
In securitization transactions, by contrast, one looks in vain for
comparably stark or dramatic effects on non-consenting third parties.
Some commentators have been concerned, along lines that grow gen-
erally from the long-standing debate about the merits of ordinary se-
cured credit, over the impact of securitization transactions on unse-
cured creditors of the originator.84  Greatly simplifying the debate,
80. Thus, the issues are whether an employee’s acts bind his or her employer, whether one
partner’s acts bind another partner, etc.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1
(1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001); HAROLD
GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 3 (2d
ed. 1990).
81. Project finance transactions are public not just in their effects but also in their origins.
The decision whether to permit a new project (or to privatize an existing one, see supra note 42
and accompanying text) is inescapably a governmental one, if only because the transactions
generally involve, at their core, permits and monopolies granted by the government.  See supra
note 40.  Additional factors such as funding project subsidies at the expense of other govern-
ment budget items, see text accompanying note 63, only strengthen this point.
For a glimpse at the extent to which governments may go in order to attract project finance
transactions, see UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 38 (recommending legislative
and even constitutional measures for prospective host governments to take).  For a discussion of
the Legislative Guide as compared to other possibilities for harmonizing project finance law, see
Pédamon, supra note 63.  See also Don Wallace, Jr., UNCITRAL Draft Legislation Guide on
Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects: Achievements and Prospects, 8 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 283 (2000).
82. See supra notes 66–72 and accompanying text.
83. Rhetorical freight can also be turned against the rhetor: opponents of FDI would
doubtless remind us that unwelcome guests such as parasites are sometimes said to have hosts,
too.
84. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 23–30 (1996); Lois R.
Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured Creditor’s Perspective, 76 TEX. L. REV. 595 (1998).
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securitization’s defenders take the position that unsecured creditors
are not harmed when the receivables are transferred for fair value,85
while securitization’s critics maintain that there may nonetheless be
an unacceptably detrimental alteration of the unsecured creditors’
risks.86  The principal lesson of that debate for purposes of this discus-
sion is that it centers on the degree of validity of abstract economic
models and on the marginal effect of imperfections in those models,
and that the effect on unsecured creditors seems accordingly to be
more postulatory, empirically elusive, or attenuated than the impact
of project finance transactions on third parties discussed above.
In the project finance context, the building blocks of the discus-
sion are stark: the net economic benefits can be patent, and so can the
political, social, labor, and environmental detriments.  The trade-offs
among these competing considerations are complex and subtle, and
the task of erecting a philosophical framework within which to judge
the acceptability of those trade-offs is difficult if not insuperable.
That these questions have been so neglected for so long is testimony
to the unfortunate disconnect between the discourse of commercial
law and other transactional law fields, on one hand, and the dis-
courses of, for example, sociology, human rights law, history, and de-
velopment economics on the other.
IV.  CONCLUSION
It is no news that business transactions have negative external-
ities.  Analysts of business transactions are adept at weighing those
externalities as an element of questions such as economic efficiency.
My purpose here is neither to engage in nor to take issue with that
mode of analysis, but instead to pose a separate question of categori-
zation and, by extension, of moral philosophy.  Is there a point at
which the negative externalities of a transaction become so heavy that
LoPucki describes securitization in terms of a broader framework of strategies by which busi-
nesses separate their assets from the risk of liability flowing from their operations.  Project fi-
nance transactions, too, can fit within this framework, and specifically within LoPucki’s “par-
ent/subsidiary strategy,” though LoPucki does not discuss them as such.  LoPucki, supra, at 20–
23.  The sponsor/SPV arrangement used in project finance, supra notes 9–11 and accompanying
text, to the extent recourse against the sponsors is limited, is largely a variation on classic par-
ent/subsidiary arrangements.
85. Where this is not the case, the argument continues, the doctrines of fraudulent convey-
ance or recharacterization and other sanctions should suffice to protect unsecured creditors.
See, e.g., STRUCTURED FINANCING TECHNIQUES, supra note 5, at 10–11, 57–58; Steven L.
Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1999).
86. See, e.g., Lupica, supra note 84, at 629–31.
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one can no longer candidly label the transaction with the morally
comforting word “consensual”?
Project finance, securitization and other large business transac-
tions are generally considered to be consensual transactions.  But that
label has been non-problematic only because observers have gener-
ally focused only on the direct parties to the transactions, who do in
fact consent to them: the originator, the SPV and the investors; the
sponsor, the project company, and the lenders.  That focus is in dan-
ger of being myopic.  Parts II and III above remind us that the trans-
actions also implicate strong interests of others who are only margin-
ally involved in the transaction per se (the obligors on the receivables
in a securitization transaction, the off-take purchaser in a project fi-
nance transaction), and even, in a project finance transaction, of still
others who are complete strangers to the transaction.  (Even when
these third-party effects are noticed, they are usually marginalized by
the very label “negative externalities:” to call them “external” is to
paint them as being of secondary importance.)
It is useful, though not dispositive, to think of consensuality in
terms of a spectrum (just as it was useful in Part I to think of the ques-
tions of recourse, true sale, specialness of SPVs, and even structured
finance itself, in terms of a spectrum).  When two individuals perform
a contract for the purchase and sale of a widget in which no third
party has an interest, this transaction belongs at the purely consensual
end of the spectrum.  By the same token, when two individuals per-
form a contract to inflict physical violence on a third, this transaction
belongs at the opposite end of the spectrum: no one would call it con-
sensual.87  But, by contrast to both of the foregoing examples, and
particularly in light of the social issues sketched in Part III, project fi-
87. In fact, of course, the law refuses to enforce contracts of this nature despite its strong
commitment to the autonomy of consenting parties.  See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS 321–61 (3d ed. 1999).  Lynn LoPucki provocatively casts ordinary secured transac-
tions in a similar mold: “Security is an agreement between A and B that C take nothing.”  Lynn
M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1899 (1994).  Jackson and
Kronman’s path-breaking article on secured transactions makes a similar observation (though
consistent with the authors’ efficiency orientation, LoPucki’s note of protest is absent): Jackson
and Kronman speak of security as “a private contract with one creditor that demotes the claims
of other creditors from an initial position of parity to one of subordination.”  Thomas H. Jack-
son & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J.
1143, 1147 (1979).
Adhesion and similar contracts raise comparably difficult questions: it would often be more
accurate to speak of parties’ acquiescence to these transactions than of their consent to them.
This is a subject for a separate article.
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nance transactions occupy some point in the difficult-to-classify mid-
dle range of the spectrum.
I do not, however, conclude that project finance transactions
therefore cross (or do not cross) some as-yet unarticulated dividing
line between consensuality and nonconsensuality.  Instead, I submit
that it is a mistake to imagine that any such articulable dividing line
would be workable, useful or accurate.  Just as the tallness of a person
or, as I argued in Part I.A, the trueness of a sale is a matter not of
black and white but rather of gradient shades of gray, so, too, is the
consensuality of a business transaction.  The label “consensual trans-
action” has a deceptively simple veneer, implying that there is some
simple metric available to help us sort out which transactions belong
in the category and which ones belong outside of it.  But if we probe
beneath that label we can see that, in reality, most transactions (proj-
ect finance or otherwise) actually belong both to some degree inside
the category and, to some degree, outside of it.  The category of con-
sensual transactions, like so many others, turns out to be a graded
category.
In evaluating the bodies of law that facilitate structured finance
or other complex transactions, then, we cannot take great comfort
from the transactions’ assertedly consensual nature.  The transactions
may indeed be perfectly justifiable when all is said and done (after all,
the American culture, at least, has a strong utilitarian and pragmatic
orientation), but if so, the justification will not be founded on the
simple basis of consensuality.  Any ultimate conclusion about the
transactions’ moral justification can only be reached after a much
more difficult weighing process: one which acknowledges that the
utilitarian’s impulse to accomplish good results will frequently clash
with the libertarian’s insistence on autonomy, agency and consent.
We currently have no accepted guidelines for this task.  And whether
we will develop them in the future depends in large part on whether
we have the resolve and candor to pursue the richer, synoptic, cross-
disciplinary dialogue that, as I note at the end of Part III, has hereto-
fore been so largely neglected.
